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ABSTRACT
While strategies of making alliances are being increasingly implemented by organizations, 
investigations show that around 50% of such undertakings are not reaching their goals. This paper 
discusses two potential reasons for the failure of alliances organized according to a theoretical 
framework for the management of strategic alliances (SA). These reasons are (a) the lack of knowledge 
about the various factors that can influence strategic alliances and (b) a way of measuring the 
success of SA that does not take into account the existence of non-declared goals on the part of 
the parent organizations in alliance agreements. As far as the first reason is concerned, the authors 
suggest the need for considering four sets of factors in the management of SA. As far as the second 
reason is concerned, they reveal some non-declared goals of Brazilian partner organizations in two 
SA that have been recently examined. 
Key words: strategic alliance, management factors, management framework, non-declared 
objectives.
RESUMO
Ao mesmo tempo em que estratégias de formação de alianças estão sendo mais utilizadas pelas 
organizações, as pesquisas indicam que cerca de 50% desses empreendimentos não estão atingindo 
seus objetivos. Este ensaio pretende discutir duas potenciais causas para o fracasso das alianças, 
organizadas em um modelo teórico de gestão de alianças estratégicas (AE). Essas causas seriam: 
(a) falta de conhecimento sobre a diversidade de fatores que são capazes de influenciar a AE, e (b) 
forma de medir o sucesso da AE, que não considera a existência de objetivos não-declarados pelas 
organizações-mãe nos acordos. Em relação à primeira, os autores sugerem a consideração de quatro 
conjuntos de fatores de gestão de AE. Quanto à segunda causa, eles mostram alguns objetivos não-
declarados de organizações parceiras brasileiras em duas AE recentemente estudadas.  
Palavras-chave: aliança estratégica, modelo de gestão, fatores de gestão, objetivos não-declarados.
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INTRODUCTION
Organizations are making wide use of alliances to 
obtain competitive advantages in the market. They can be 
seen as cooperative undertakings with at least two parent 
organizations. They aim at reducing costs, minimizing risks, 
and learning by accessing resources and through the insertion 
of other organizations from the social network.
Many forms of alliances can be found in more dynamic 
and risky business areas, for example in the Research & 
Development area, and in market expansion area, particularly 
agreements between two or more parent organizations from 
different countries. Alliances can be classified as formalization 
criteria in three basic arrangements: joint ventures (JV) – formal 
alliances through a documented agreement resulting in a new 
legal entity; alliances formed through documented agreements 
in a limited period of time without resulting in a new company; 
alliances formed by informal agreements.
Despite the undoubted importance of alliances for 
organizations and the extensive theoretical development of 
this topic, the records of high percentages of failure or lack 
of success of alliances persist. The percentage of failure in 
alliances is of around 50% at the least, according to Das and 
Teng (1999, 2001), Tidd et al. (2001), Lam (2004), De Man 
(2005), and Todeva and Knoke (2005). This is a preoccupying 
index that leads to a need for new investigations on the 
stability of strategic alliances.
From the point of view of this paper, two main reasons 
could explain this high index of failures. One of them is the lack 
of an integrated view of all factors involved in the management 
of an alliance. This means the lack of knowledge by managers 
of the set of variables that may influence the performance of 
alliances. The other reason is that the objectives that parent 
organizations declare before and during the alliance do not 
represent completely their real goals. That might lead to 
a wrong performance assessment, since it is usually made 
upon declared objectives only. Thus, the main questions to 
be answered by this article are, “What are the management 
factors in a SA?” and “How to deal with the different nature 
of objectives in a SA assessment?”
Therefore, this article intends to demonstrate a previous 
theoretical framework for alliance management made up of a 
series of management factors and to recognize non-declared 
objectives of parent organizations before and during the 
alliance operation. This framework represents a step ahead 
regarding the partial view of alliance management found in the 
literature. It can be exemplified through the model proposed 
by Callahan and Mackenzie (1999), who only discuss factors 
related to the control of the alliance’s the internal activities. 
Another model can be found in Techemayer’s (2002) framework, 
which only involves factors of management originated inside 
the alliances. It is also necessary to consider the outside factors, 
such as factors from the external environment, among others. 
In the same way, none of them approaches the need for looking 
at the non-declared objectives of the parent organizations. 
Another objective of this paper is to discuss the adjustment of 
the management framework presented here by asking about its 
basic principles involved in common and particular, declared 
and non-declared objectives of parent organizations.
This article acknowledges that there are formal and 
informal alliances; in all of them it is possible to distinguish 
two phases, viz. before and after the agreement. The first 
phase is called pre-alliance and involves a strategic decision 
by the parent organizations, the choice of a partner and the 
agreement negotiation. The second phase is called alliance 
proper and it consists of the implementation and finishing 
stages of the SA. In formal alliances, these phases are clearly 
separated by the contract signature. The analyses available 
refer mainly to technological alliances, which are usually 
formed between two potentially competing organizations. 
The model also applies to other alliance types, such as those 
between clients and suppliers or firms and research institutions. 
However, the difficulties of management should be more 
relevant if there are similar interests in the cooperation.
Our purpose here is to discuss essential aspects in order 
to clarify what is considered as a successful alliance, and 
for that we distinguish between declared and non-declared 
objectives. This shall be done below. However, first we briefly 
approach the main theoretical alliances this study refers to. 
This is also designed to review previous studies that showed 
a high percentage of failures in this kind of venture. The 
management factors are discussed and organized in Table 1. 
Figure 1 presents the theoretical framework of management, 
followed by a discussion about its adjustment to the practice 
and some examples from the field. The final section brings 
considerations on how this article’s analysis could help future 
alliances to be successful and more stable.
THEORIES THAT SUPPORT STUDIES ABOUT ALLIANCES
Since the first academic efforts to design theories 
applicable to alliances were made, many attempts have been 
undertaken. Several theoretical frameworks or models with 
different capabilities to explain the phenomenon of SA have 
been built. A recent empirical-theoretical review shows that 
the Transaction Costs Economy (TCE) and the Resource Based 
View (RBV) are being widely used. In a study that highlights its 
complementarity to RBV, Foss and Foss (2004) analyze some 
TCE failures in their explanation of the competitive advantage 
of organizations. They argue that “The dominant contemporary 
approach to the analysis of sustained competitive advantage 
is the RBV [...]” (Foss and Foss, 2004, p. 109).
Besides these two predominant theories, viz. TCE and 
RBV, there are other theories being widely used in studies 
about alliances. Ireland et al. (2002), for example, examined 
the alliance management from these two perspectives and also 
from the point of view of the social network theory. The present 
view on alliance framework is expanding based on these two 
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approaches, emphasizing the influence that one alliance can 
exert on another that involves the same organization (Gulati, 
1998). This is also implied by the concept of “constellations 
of alliances” as described by Gomes-Casseres (1998). At the 
same time the strategic issues certainly lie in the alliance’s 
origins, due to what is always highlighted when the topic is 
the management. Two of the theories cited by Das and Teng 
(2000) refer to such issues, which were also addressed in the 
comprehensive study by Hamel and Prahalad (1995) and in a 
specific study by Doz and Hamel (2000).
SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF ALLIANCES: 
A MATTER OF STABILITY 
Alliances can succeed or fail in a complete or partial 
sense. The success or failure grade may be represented by a 
continuous line from complete success to complete failure. 
This is similar limits to Inkpen and Beamish’s (1997) approach 
to stability and instability. According to these authors, 
instability is a major change in partner relationship status 
that is unplanned and premature from one or both partners’ 
perspectives. Thus, a partially unstable SA would be subject 
to failure and to success to some degree. Complete stability 
could be related to complete success of a SA in the same way 
that instability could be identified as failure.
Several studies have been conducted to identify the main 
causes for the failure of alliances, such as those described by 
Tidd et al. (2001) and Ireland et al. (2002). In their book, Tidd 
et al. (2001, p. 197) state that “almost all innovation demands 
some form of collaborative arrangement to development or 
marketing, but the grade of failure of that alliance remain high” 
(here it means complete failure). Then they show the results of 
16 previous studies that could help them to describe 10 more 
common reasons for alliances to fail: divergent strategies and 
goals (50%), problems of partners (38%), relationship between 
strong and weak partners (38%), cultural differences (25%), 
insufficient confidence (25%), operational and geographic 
adjustment (25%), personal conflicts (25%), lack of commitment 
(25%), unreal expectations (25%), and asymmetric incentives 
(13%). Ireland et al. (2002) either reviewed the literature to find 
causes for alliances to fail and found them described by Doz 
(1996): (a) conflicts generated by divergence of goals (which is 
inherent to alliances, but should be controlled); (b) opportunism 
of one of the partners; and (c) cultural differences of the partners. 
Moreover, several works, such as Inkpen (2000), Kale et al. (2000), 
Khanna et al. (1998), Levine and Byrne (1986), and Spekman et 
al. (1998) identified the choice of an inadequate partner and 
the difficulties to anticipate the capacity of value creation as 
failure factors of SA.
Since it is an entirely practical matter, the failure in an 
alliance can also be easily identified or demonstrated by firms’ 
consultants. This can be found in Lam’s paper (2004) titled 
Why Alliances Fail?, which is based on his experiences and 
studies at biotechnological and pharmaceutical companies. 
The paper examines the grades of failure, analyzes on what 
failures might be based and suggests ways for pharmaceutical 
industries to improve their results. The author cites two lists of 
failure causes, indicated by two firms’ consultant groups. The 
first group emphasizes cultural differences, company objectives, 
leadership, integration processes, market potential, technologies, 
technology environment, and governance structure. The second 
one contains a more detailed list with the following causes: 
senior management changes, slow or failed results, drastic 
change in business environment, weak commitment, merger 
or acquisition changes priority, poor leadership, ineffective 
governance, and incompatible objectives.
A recent review by Todeva and Knoke (2005) reaffirms 
that many analysts – they cite Harrigan (1988), Kogut (1988), 
and Dacin et al. (1997) – found high levels of instability and 
dissolution of SA with failure grades close to 50%. They also 
cite other studies, such as Bleeke and Ernest (1995), which 
state that more than 80% of international alliances ended in 
acquisition. The real failure index of 50% to 80% is not desired 
and justified for any undertaking that has so many advantages 
at the theoretical level.
In spite of the high level of alliance failure demonstrated 
by research, the number of organizations making partnerships 
has significantly increased. This raises the question whether 
the metrics being used are capable to produce unreal alliance 
failure results. Another possibility is that the non-declared 
objectives are as relevant as or even more relevant than the 
declared ones for organizations to justify the establishment 
of a new SA.
ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE 
PARENT ORGANIZATIONS IN ALLIANCES
According to the majority of previous studies, there are 
many objectives related to the establishment of SA. However, 
these studies do not specify whether those are objectives of 
the alliance per se (as a new venture) or objectives of one or 
the other parent organization for the SA. The objectives of the 
alliance per se are usually discussed by parent organizations 
and the main ones are usually expressed in the contract (in 
formal alliances). These types of objectives are called declared 
ones. The objectives of one or the other parent organization 
for the SA may be discussed between the partners or not. The 
goals that are not discussed are called non-declared objectives 
in this paper.
Declared and non-declared objectives do not have exactly 
the same meaning as common and private goals (see Ariño, 
1995, 2003). Common goals are the shared interests of the 
partners in a SA, and private ones are the goals which each 
firm has for the SA and are not shared with its partner (Ariño, 
1995, 2003). Thus, non-shared objectives are not the same 
as non-declared ones, because an objective can be important 
for both partners but they cannot declare it. In the same way, 
shared does not mean the same as declared.
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The considerable amount of knowledge acquired about 
SA objectives is probably much more related to the declared 
goals than to non-declared ones. However, a detailed analysis 
of the strategic nature of alliances may indicate the real 
objectives that the parent organizations have when they 
form alliances with other organizations and that are neither 
declared to the partner during the negotiation nor included in 
the formal contract, when there is one. The following topics 
explain this in more detail.
DECLARED OBJECTIVES
Ruffoni and Silva (2000) make a review of the literature 
on objectives of organizations when they form alliances. They 
offer an extensive list that contains the following objectives: 
developing new products and processes, adapting already 
existing products and processes, reducing the period of 
technological development, reducing the costs of technological 
development, using international network to share information, 
accessing new markets (national or international), having an 
almost vertical integration, becoming integrated into a big 
organization block, obtaining economy of scale and scope, 
obtaining competitive prices, getting access to structured 
marketing channels, and overcoming customs or legal barriers. 
Some objectives are found in more than one study, such as the 
improvement of the innovation capacity (Linnarsson and Werr, 
2004; Oliveira and Goulart, 2003), the learning or acquisition 
of new competences (Fisher et al., 2002; Khaana et al., 1998), 
the development of new products (Liboni et al., 2004; Tidd et 
al., 2001), and technology transference.
Some authors, such as Das and Teng (2000), use the 
RBV theory to express the objectives that organizations have 
in forming alliances. Their work highlights Kogut’s (1998) 
learning model, which contains a detailed view of alliance 
formation based on some resources, for example knowledge 
and technology. Kogut presents the following objectives for the 
establishment of alliances: acquisition of organizational know-
how from other firms, and maintenance of one’s own know-
how with appropriation of other resources from the partner. Das 
and Teng (2000) amplify this model to other kinds of resources 
and indicate two reasons why organizations form SA or make 
mergers or acquisitions: (a) obtaining other resources, and (b) 
maintaining and developing their own resources by combining 
them with others resources of/from partner organizations.
One can observe that the majority of the alliance 
objectives explained in the literature refer to tangible 
or proprietary resources. Therefore, it is possible that a 
representative fraction of organizations that form alliances 
have the actual goal of accessing knowledge resources of 
the other organizations, such as the learning and acquisition 
of new competences. Because these kinds of objectives are 
difficult to measure, it may be that agreements focus more 
on proprietary resources. This would be an additional cause 
of distortion between real objectives and those that are made 
explicit in the agreement. These aspects must be considered 
in a framework of alliance management and are explored in 
the next section.
NON-DECLARED OBJECTIVES
Some researchers demonstrate the strategic nature of 
the alliances, but in general they do not take into account the 
existence of non-declared objectives in the studies about SA. 
Only Ariño (1995, 2003) has discussed a special kind of goals 
called private ones. However, they are similar to non-declared 
objectives, but not identical with them. Moreover, this author 
does not discuss the influence of this kind of objectives on the 
stability or success grade of SA.
Some objectives may be kept as non-declared by a parent 
organization out of two basic motivations: (a) their existence 
is irrelevant to the partner; (b) they are so strategic that they 
are kept in secret in order to gain more than what is formally 
planned with the SA. There is one more interesting aspect to 
observe regarding the non-declared objectives: They may arise 
before or after the alliance contract. In this sense, they can 
be called initial or emerging based on considerations made by 
Doz (1996) and Ariño (2003).
Emerging non-declared objectives are those that the 
organization had not planned until the alliance agreement was 
made. These objectives originate during the implementation 
stage because organizations realize that an alliance has more 
potential than they had expected because some new possibilities 
become clear when it is carried out (implementation stage). 
When an organization sees these new objectives, the focus 
changes as it looks for new results in the cooperation. In such 
a situation, the organization has at least two options: to revise 
the agreement clarifying the new objectives and renegotiating 
with the partner, or to keep silence about its newly realized 
objectives. If the organization makes the first option, the 
emerging non-declared objectives become declared ones. If it 
makes the second option, the emerging objectives remain as 
non-declared ones.
Initial non-declared objectives appear to have more 
strategic characteristics than the emerging ones. Sometimes 
a partner prefers not to address some objectives in the 
negotiation because they do not seem important to and 
might not affect the other partner. However, many times, 
if one partner realizes these objectives of the other partner, 
the possible competitive advantage of the first partner will 
be reduced or disappear. Some kinds of learning can be an 
example of initial non-declared objectives. Another one can 
be the “negative strategies”, i.e. strategies of one organization 
designed to obtain competitive advantages from disadvantages 
caused to the other organization. This is a kind of relationship 
in which one organization uses the weakness of another to 
obtain competitive advantage; it is the same principle of 
competition. Thus, in this situation the planned cooperation 
works as a competitive relationship.
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WHAT DOES SUCCESS MEAN FOR SA? WHAT DOES 
SUCCESS MEAN FOR THE PARENT ORGANIZATIONS IN 
THE SA?
Das and Teng (2000), based on previous studies, argue 
that the performance of SA can be measured in several different 
ways, such as alliance longevity, profitability, or in terms of 
meeting the objectives of the individual partner organizations. 
In the latter approach, they recognize that each partner firm 
can evaluate the performance of an alliance differently. In their 
paper, Das and Teng (2000) see alliance performance as the 
degree to which agreed upon objectives of an alliance per se 
are achieved. Thus, the definition of success depends on which 
point of view is being used, i.e. whether it is the alliance per 
se or the parent organizations.
Regarding alliances per se, the partners should have the 
same objectives, i.e. perform activities in order to achieve the 
common objectives for both organizations, instead of each 
one’s different objectives. From the point of view of common or 
declared objectives, the measure of the grade of success would 
be the same for both organizations. However, considering the 
existence of non-declared objectives of parent organizations, 
there are other points of view to be taken into account for an 
alliance’s success. This is related to what success means for the 
parent organizations in the formation of alliances.
Thus, the success of an alliance and the success that each 
parent organization can get from it are completely different. It 
is much more difficult to measure the success that each parent 
organization can get separately because this is a very complex 
issue. This analysis is very similar to the view of Todeva and 
Knoke (2005), which is that the success of an alliance “meant 
that the partners achieved their own strategic objectives and 
recovered their financial capital costs”.  
Thus, the success grade of each parent organization 
separately regarding the alliance seems to be more difficult 
to measure than the success of the alliance per se. This is 
because the non-declared objectives may be less definite 
than the declared ones that appear in the contract. Moreover, 
each organization has a set of strategic objectives that can 
be met to various degrees by an alliance or other – since an 
organization can participate in one or more alliances with 
other organizations at the same time. Anyway, each partner 
should try to measure the performance of its SA in terms of 
its non-declared objectives.
The evaluation of the success or failure of alliances 
should not be a final measurement. Whether the alliance is for 
a limited or an unlimited term, managers should establish ways 
of measuring the performance during and after the alliance 
implementation. At the end of an alliance, even if it ended 
due to a contract clause or other unforeseen circumstances, 
the partners must incorporate the results achieved from this 
venture in order to get competitive capacity. 
Therefore, before trying to establish the forms of the 
measurement of success for a SA, it is necessary to determine 
what kind of success shall be measured. It might be the 
success of the alliance per se, or the success that one or the 
other parent organization got from the alliance. For each case 
there will be different forms of measurement and the results 
will vary. These considerations should certainly be present in a 
framework of SA management in order to improve the rewards 
of the parent organizations.
FACTORS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF SA
Managing alliances means to make decisions that involve 
uncertainty and risks. Besides the inherent uncertainty of the 
business, management would be much better if risks could 
be reduced with good decisions, improving the conditions of 
the alliance to get a good performance. The best conditions 
of management take alliances to success. Several studies 
discuss these risks and present variables and factors for the 
success of SA.
The meanings of “risks”, “variables” and “success 
factors” are different, but all of them can be used to analyze 
the management process of the SA and the conditions for 
its success. They constitute important factors that managers 
should observe so that alliances reach better performance 
levels. Because of this, in this study “risks”, “variables”, 
and “success factors” are taken as similar and are called 
management factors.
Authors who discuss management factors include Lam 
(2004), Tidd et al. (2001), Techemayer (2002), Das and Teng 
(1999, 2001), Gomes-Casseres (1998), Bruno and Vasconcellos 
(1996), and Doz (1996). Studies by these authors provided 
the authors of this article means to organize two sets of 
management factors: the factors originated in the pre-alliance 
phase and the factors originated in the alliance phase. An 
analysis made after this literature review brought the indication 
of several other factors. Part of these new factors originates 
in the pre-alliance; another part in the alliance, and a third 
part does not fit in any of these phases. These factors were 
listed and called external factors. They were classified in two 
new sets that were called factors originated in the parent 
organizations’ strategies (including the influence of the 
network of relationships of the parent organizations) and 
factors originated in the institutional environment. These four 
sets of factors resulted in more than one hundred factors, 
which were then organized in groups, each one represented 
by a construct, according to the similarity of these groups of 
factors. These constructs are presented in Table 1.
All management factors should be considered in the 
alliance management. Heedlessness or unfamiliarity with some 
of these sources of influences will reduce the potential for 
success in the alliance. On the other hand, paying attention 
to this set of factors is essential for an effective management. 
Obviously there will be a hierarchy of the factors that might 
influence the alliance’s success. However, any measurement 
of the relative importance of the management factors for the 
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performance of an alliance should only be possible on the basis 
of specific analyses such as those limited by a sector.
A PRELIMINARY FRAMEWORK 
OF ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT 
The ideas discussed in this paper can support the building 
of a preliminary framework of alliance management presented 
in Figure 1. It contains a simplified representation of how 
management, management factors and alliance objectives 
are connected to the real alliances. This framework is called 
preliminary in order to demonstrate that this building is the first 
step of a major study that should be made on a management 
framework for SA.
Figure 1 shows the parent organizations (A and B) that 
are establishing the alliance per se (organization C). The pre-
alliance is the phase before the alliance proper and it is made 
up of the following stages: (a) strategic definition of a parent 
organization to form an alliance, (b) identification of a partner 
among all organizations in the market, (c) negotiation of an 
agreement. The alliance phase is made up of (a) implementation 
of cooperative activities, and (b) end of cooperative activities.
The four sets of management factors are represented in 
Figure 1 according to where they originated and influence the 
alliance as indicated by the arrows that point to the alliance. 
The strategic objectives of A and B per se are represented in 
the rectangles for parent organizations A and B. The declared 
objectives of A and B in the alliance formation are represented 
in the rectangle for organization C (the alliance). On the right 
and left side of C there are grey areas which represent the 
non-declared objectives of organizations A and B separately. 
Table 1 - Constructs resulting from the grouping of management factors related to its source and alliance stages.
Source of the factors 
and constructs
Stages of alliances Constructs
Pre-alliance phase Strategic defi nition Previous experience of organization in cooperation activities 
Planning ability 
CEO (Chief Executive Offi cer) commitment 
Chose of the partner Compatibility of the parent organizations strategic objectives 




Clarity of the alliance objectives
High administration involvement




Choice of the contract terms
Alliance phase Implementation Ability to acquiring knowledge
High administration infl uence
Managers competency
Monitoring 





Performance of parent organizations 
Structural changes of parent organizations 
Quality of parent organizations relationship
Institutional 
environment
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Figure 1 - Theoretical framework of alliance management.
Pre-alliance 
Alliance (C)  
Non-declared 
objectives of A 
regarding to C 
Non-declared 
objectives of B 




originated in the pre-
alliance phase 
Management factors originated 
in the alliance phase 
Management factors originated in 
the institutional environment 
Management factors 
originated in the parent 
organizations strategies 
Parent organization (A) 
Strategic objectives of (A) 
Parent organization (B) 
Strategic objectives of (B) 
They are in the shadow area of A and B that influences their 
view of the alliance’s results, but does not influence the 
measurement of the alliance’s performance in the view of the 
alliance managers.
At the bottom of Figure 1 there are two paths that the 
manager could take. One of them is a formal management, 
which is the management taken by vision from C about 
the declared objectives. This management performance will 
represent the effectiveness of C in achieving the common 
objectives of the alliance. Another path is the parallel 
management, which is the one taken by vision of both partners 
(A and B) about the non-declared objectives. This management 
performance represents the effectiveness of C in taking the 
non-declared objectives of A and B in the alliance formation.
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METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURE
After organizing the theoretical framework, a search for 
non-declared objectives in two strategic alliances, viz. SA1 and 
SA2, was undertaken. In a complete study, the alliances were 
identified and case studies were done in order to verify de 
adequacy of the framework in each case. However, this paper 
does not intend to explain all results of the case studies. The 
authors just want to show some results related to non-declared 
objectives and management factors.
Both alliances studied have the following characteristics: 
(a) they are dyadic; (b) they are formed between a Brazilian and 
a foreign manufacturing company; (c) the operation occurs in 
the Brazilian partner’s manufacturing site; (d) there are formal 
cooperation contracts. Interviews with the main managers 
of the alliances were made from July 2007 to February 2008, 
based on two research protocols. The first protocol included all 
constructs presented in Table 1 as points of discussion. The main 
point of the protocols was: How has each construct contributed 
to the alliance’s success? After talking about all constructs, 
the interviewer invited the managers to talk about specific 
constructs that refer to objectives of the alliance partners. This 
means spelling out the data about the two constructs in Table 1, 
which constituted the second research protocol: “clarity of the 
alliance objectives” from the negotiation phase and “monitoring” 
of objectives from the implementation phase. In this way, it 
was possible to obtain data in order to analyze the adequacy of 
the constructs of Table 1 as management factors in SA and the 
existence of non-declared objectives.
THE ROLE OF THE CONSTRUCTS REGARDING
SA MANAGEMENT 
As results, all constructs presented were confirmed by 
managers as important for the success of the SA. This was not 
a surprise because of the previous extensive theoretical and 
analytical research that resulted in Table 1.
EXAMPLES OF NON-DECLARED OBJECTIVES OF BRAZILIAN 
PARTNERS IN SAS 
The most interesting data from the point of view of this 
paper is the perception of the non-declared objectives of A 
and B related to C. This means that one can observe in both 
cases data representative of the existence of the gray region 
shown in Figure 1. Table 2 shows the declared and non-declared 
objectives of the Brazilian partners in SA1 and SA2.
Table 2 shows many kinds of objectives. Contractual 
objectives constitute the object of the cooperation and are 
usually included in the contract. In both alliances studied 
other objectives addressed by partners in the negotiation were 
detected, due to the interest of both partners, and they were 
like a practical consequence of the contractual objectives. There 
are also emerging objectives that may appear even though the 
contract is already made. They were not realized or predicted 
during the partners’ negotiation. These emerging objectives can 
be declared or non-declared, depending on their characteristics.
Table 2 also shows non-declared objectives of the 
Brazilian partner that are very different from the declared 
ones. It can be perceived that the Brazilian partner wanted 
to enhance the value of its brand on the basis of the public 
association of its own brand with the partner’s brand. Moreover, 
in the alliance it was very important for this partner to use 
its available physical resources in order to help the company 
to get out of a financial crisis. In the SA2 case, from the 
Brazilian partner’s non-declared main objective it could be 
seen that SA2 became independent from an old commercial 
distributor partner. It was very relevant for Brazilian partner 
because before this alliance its old partner had high distribution 
rights on the sales of manufactured SA2 products. Thus, as the 
alliance would bring new products, the old partner would not 
have financial rights on the sales of those products.
SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE MANAGERS OF 
ALLIANCES, WHO TAKES FORMAL AND PARALLEL 
MANAGEMENT
The alliance managers are the people responsible for 
making decisions during the stages of implementation and 
end of the SA. It is possible that each parent organization 
appoints a manager to conduct its business interests in the 
alliance. Thus, the managers of A and B shall manage the 
organization C at the same time. These managers can be the 
ones who participated in the pre-alliance phase or others 
who were appointed in the beginning of the alliance phase. 
It is possible that both parent organizations prefer to hire an 
external manager only to represent them in the alliance, only 
for the stages of implementation and end.
The choice by A and B of who shall manage the alliance 
will not make any difference in their capacity to perform a 
formal management of the alliance. However, this choice 
will make an enormous difference for the conditions that the 
manager has to make a parallel management. If there are two 
managers, one of them from A and another from B, each one 
of them will possibly view the non-declared objectives from 
their original organization. Thus, the manager from A could 
make the formal management and the parallel management 
according to the non-declared objectives of A, and the same 
would apply to the manager from B.
HOW THE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK CAN HELP 
ALLIANCES AND PARENT ORGANIZATIONS TO REACH 
THEIR OBJECTIVES 
Basically, the theoretical framework of alliance 
management presented by Figure 1 intends to clarify some 
important differences between declared and non-declared 
objectives and to organize the sets of management factors 
that could influence the alliances’ results.
Reaching declared objectives is a basic function of 
alliance managers. In this way, the framework should be used 
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by managers to view all the possible variation factors of the 
alliance’s performance. Their awareness of the four sets of 
factors is the first necessary step for the effectiveness of the 
alliance management.
Reaching non-declared objectives would not be 
considered a basic function of alliance managers, but frequently 
it could be more important than achieving declared objectives 
- from the point of view of A, B or both. In this situation, the 
framework should be used by managers to understand the 
differences between all kinds of objectives, from declared to 
non-declared initial and emerging ones, and later try to get 
those that are possible (if the manager is more related to A, B 
or both at the same time). Thus, it is very important for each 
partner to keep at least a manager in a SA who knows all its 
objectives in order to be able to make good decisions according 
to these objectives. So, they would be able to help alliance to 
get high performance regarding the declared and non-declared 
objectives at the same time.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The framework presented was based on the assumption 
that there were at least four sets of different management 
factors that influenced the performance of SA and that there 
were different kinds of objectives that had to be taken into 
account to manage SA. According to these assumptions, 
non-declared objectives could be determining factors for the 
alliance’s success or failure from the parent organization’s 
point of view.
Supposing that each partner can have more than only 
one objective when the partners form the alliance, it is very 
likely that the main objectives have not been declared, even 
though this happens sometimes. Thus, the success or failure 
of the alliance measured on the basis of the contract terms 
can become irrelevant for them. This means that an alliance 
considered as failed might make it possible for one or more 
parent organizations to reach non-declared objectives. In this 
case, an apparently failed alliance might represent the success 
of A or B or both of them. However, for some strategic reason, 
it is very likely that organizations are not interested in showing 
the results of non-declared objectives, which can be called 
non-declared results as well.
First the manager of the alliance shall reach the 
objectives of C through formal management. Depending on 
who is the manager of the alliance, the non-declared objectives 
of A or B can be disclosed, and on the basis of the disclosed 
objectives the manager can make a parallel management. This 
is more likely to occur if the manager is from A, B, or both of 
them. If the manager is external to the parent organizations, it 
will be more difficult and unlikely that someone could manage 
from the point of view of non-declared objectives.
A manager that has the ability to look at all variables that 
the framework suggests in a particular alliance will be more 
able to reconsider the strategy related to the agreement and 
also get better results from the alliance. However, the success 
of C might not reflect success from the point of view of A or B. 
In this case, each organization would know that the rewards of 
the other organization would be different, probably higher than 
the rewards recorded in the evaluation of the alliance. However, 
none of them would be interested to expose the detailed rewards, 
since the parent organizations might be potential competitors. 
Despite of the end of the cooperation, the organizations must 
use the results to improve their future competitiveness.
Table 2 - Declared and non-declared objectives of Brazilian partners in SA1 and SA2.
SA1 SA2
Object of the 
cooperation




Cooperation in manufacturing trucks according to 
a monthly plan (quantities) 
Other declared objectives:
Cost reduction in manufacturing
Contractual objective:
Cooperation in manufacturing machinery 
according to the market absorption
Other declared objectives:
Reducing taxes for international trade




For becoming a stronger brand by association 
with a stronger world brand
Using physical resources of the company to 
generate money fl ow and to take out the 
company from fi nancial crises
Becoming free from a old partnership with a 
commercial distributor that had distribution 
rights above all sales of products they 
manufactured prior to this partnership
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The non-declared objectives shown in Table 2 seem very 
important to Brazilian partners in SA1 and SA2. Maybe they 
could bring the same or more value for those partners than the 
declared objectives. Thus, this data confirms the possibility that 
the high index of alliance failure pointed out by previous studies 
might not represent the real statistics of the effectiveness of 
such undertakings. It suggests that the inquiry about the success 
must be related to different kinds of objectives or to the point 
of view that is adopted. This means that in order to investigate 
the performance of alliances one has to specify which point of 
view is being taken, whether of A, B or C.
This paper showed two examples of alliances whose 
objectives were different from the points of view of each 
partner and the contract as well. These cases show it could 
happen in real alliances. Therefore, this emphasizes the need 
for a parallel management for the alliance’s success. However, 
more studies on this matter, including quantitative ones, are 
necessary in order to understand the impact of these types of 
objectives on the SA success index. Maybe another paper would 
be necessary to show more details of the variables involved in 
the SA process used as an example here.
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